Quite recently, enhancing security against device-attack vulnerability has been theoretically challenging but also practically important in quantum cryptographic communication.
an assumption regarding device-trustworthiness or device-reliability cannot always be made due to the room for possibility of hacking those devices or softwares being compromised beforehand.
The now accepted way to approach this problem is to exploit the Bell inequality violation with the entanglement distributed between the communicating mates, e.g., in the device-independent scenarios (see ref. [4] , and refs. [5, 6] for recent results). Still, we are far from the faithful design and realization of such a task, as probably it is quite difficult to generate and distribute the entanglement between far-away places. Thus we feel that it would be fair to find a moderate-step solution taking into consideration the feasibility of current technology [7, 8] .
To deal with such an issue and make our idea general in a strict scenario, we consider here an important branch of the quantum communication scheme, called quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , which allows two parties Alice and Bob to communicate directly in secret without performing any additional tasks, e.g., a pre-distribution of the secret-keys. The QSDC scheme has received interest as it appears to be efficient [12, 18, 19] and may result in some advantages with any distributed quantum tasks [20, 21] or quantum network [22] . Here we note that QSDC is substantially different from the quantum key distribution (QKD) in which the two remote users create the private key, and then communicate their messages via classical channel [23] . The security requirements for QSDC are also stricter than those for QKD (or other quantum cryptographic schemes), because none of the useful information of the secret message should leak out to an eavesdropper; once the eavesdropper has already extracted any information of the secrete message, the QSDC protocol may be of no use even if the eavesdropper can be identified. Thus, we will present an explicit realization of our idea based on using this QSDC scheme, preserving the essential content and general applicability.
Keeping the above-described in mind, we design and propose a "preparation-attack-immune QSDC" in a linear-optical framework. The proposed QSDC scheme runs with the photons moving along the pathways 'Alice → Bob' and 'Bob → Alice.' More specifically, a single-photon generated on Bob's side is thrown to Alice, and it can be reflected-without being assisted by the quantum memory-to Bob with a bit of Alice's message and/or the potential warning on the existence of any malicious eavesdropper, say Eve. The photon could also be caught in one of Alice's detectors, in which this case, Alice and Bob get another chance to detect Eve. On the basis of the naive analysis, we address that it is probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical to eavesdrop on even one bit of the message due to the complications of the protocol. In particular, the most remarkable feature is that the security of our protocol is not seriously damaged even considering a powerful Eve who can look at Bob's whole preparation settings, whereas other single-photon based QSDC schemes (and most existing quantum cryptographic protocols) may become insecure. This new kind of advantage, called preparation-attack immunity, originates from the simultaneous use of the two degrees of freedom of the single-photon that are the polarization and path modes. We indicate that our idea can be generalized to other single-photon based QKD protocols.
RESULTS
First, we briefly describe the scenario of our QSDC scheme. Alice intends to securely deliver a secret message to Bob. The scenario and method follows those of the conventional QSDC schemes designed based on using the single-particle quantum carriers. Bob generates a quantum particle in a state ∈ {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } and sends it to Alice through a quantum channel C. Here,
Then, Alice encodes a bit of her message by applying a unitary ∈ {1 1,σ y } (we call "message operation" hereafter) to the incoming particle and reflects it to Bob through the same channel C. Whether or not the state of the returning particle is flipped corresponds to the bit of the message from Alice: '0' when Alice acts1 1, and otherwise, '1' when Alice doesσ y . In this work, we have shown that an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot decode the message bits even in the case where all information of Bob's preparation and encoding is leaked, in contrast to the previous schemes [13, 24, 25] -in this sense, we call our scheme "preparation-attack-immune QSDC."
A. Linear-optical setting.
We then describe the linear-optical setting of our preparation-attack-immune QSDC protocol.
Firstly, let us describe the setup which consists of a single-photon source/detector, beam-splitter (BS), polarization beam-splitter (PBS), and quarter/half wave-plates (QWP/HWP) [see Fig. 1(a) ].
Bob has a single-photon preparation module, and a 'tunable' beam-splitter (T-BS) which is nothing but a Mach-Zehnder interferometer having a tunable phase ϕ ∈ 0,
. A polarization analyzer D B is also equipped on Bob's side to decode the bits of Alice's message or to check for the existence of Eve's eavesdropping. On the other hand, Alice has four H/V polarization detection modules, denoted by D A,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4). Alice also employs the quarter wave-plate QWP(ϑ) and a mirror to implement a message operation1 1 orσ y , where ϑ are the real controllable parameters (i.e., rotation angles) of QWP. Here we assume that ϑ can precisely be controlled to be either π 2 or π 4 for the implementations of1 1 andσ y , respectively (as will be described later). This module is placed on each pathway (hereafter called "arm"). We represent 
To provide a more detailed explanation, the polarization of the photon experiencing the QWP 
Then, the general form of the message operation can be represented aŝ
Therefore we can implement the message operationÛ A, (R or L) as in Eq. only two wave-plates, QWP-HWP, would suffice in our case) [27] . Then, Bob sends the prepared photon to Alice. Here Bob chooses one of the four possible ways to transmit the photon, each of which is determined by the setting ϕ ∈ 0,
2 , π of T-BS. More specifically, if Bob sets ϕ = 0 or ϕ = π, then the photon passing through T-BS is either to be transmitted toward R-arm or to be reflected toward L-arm deterministically. On the other hand, if ϕ = π 2 or ϕ = 3π 2 , the photon can travel in both R-arm and L-arm, simultaneously; in other words, here the two paths are superposed in these cases. In fact, such a "superposition path" plays an important role in our protocol.
From now on we describe the process and all occurring events in the two kinds of photon travel paths.
(i) Deterministic path (ϕ = 0 and ϕ = π). -We first consider that the prepared photon goes along the deterministic paths toward either R-arm (i.e., ϕ = 0) or L-arm (i.e., ϕ = π). Let us first consider that the traveling photon passes through the beam-splitter BS 1 or BS 2 for each ϕ-setting.
In such settings, Bob can receive back the reflected photon. Note that if ϕ = 0 or ϕ = π, the reflected photon must come into the analyzer due to the trait of T-BS. In this case, Bob publicly announces only the fact that the photon returns back, and Alice announces which arm (R or L) the valid message operation is carried out in. Here, if the initial path of the photon is matched to the arm announced by Alice, Bob can decode the bit of Alice's message by analyzing whether the initially prepared polarization is flipped or not. Otherwise, in the not-matched case, the measured polarization in Bob's analyzer is to be used to check if there exists Eve's eavesdropping in the way of Bob → Alice or Alice → Bob, because the polarization should be unchanged in this case.
Another possibility when ϕ = 0 or ϕ = π is that the reflected photon could also be caught by her detection (the number n and the presumed Bob's original polarization) according to the rule described in (i). Then Bob has a chance to check the alteration of the polarization, if the photon is initially prepared as |H or |V . The last possibility is that the photon returns back after passing through all of Alice's detectors. In this case, the photon would just be discarded. First we evaluate the event probabilities (by observing Fig. 2 ) and make the following analyses not taking into account the channel errors and imperfections of the implementing devices. The photon delivers a bit of Alice's message with probability P message = 1 16 , or is used to detect Eve with probability P Eve-check = 5 8 . The photon could be wasted with probability P discard = 5 16 , giving no contribution. Here, it is worth noting that it is possible to reduce the overall time to complete the protocol by increasing the probability P message of the message encoding. It can actually be done by favorably dialing the reflectance r (or the transmittance t = 1 − r) of the beam-splitters BS 1 and BS 2 , instead of using a conventional 50:50 (i.e., r = t = 1 2 ). To show this more explicitly, we can use the mappings of the photon creation operators in each modes with respect to ϕ:
(for ϕ = π) . 
in which we assumed that the probabilities of choosing ϕ ∈ {0, , and P discard = 1 2 . However, as Bob does not need to use the superposition path in this case, the actual event probabilities are P message = 1 2 , P Eve-check = 1 2 , and P discard = 0. Such a setting, of course, runs effectively and is efficient in the sense that there are no discarded photons. In fact, this setting can be regarded as a combination of two BB84 protocols using T-BS. However, note that it may become insecure against the eavesdropping of Eve who can peep at Bob's polarization encoding. This means that the critical advantage, i.e., the preparation-attack immunity (will be described below), cannot be achieved just by adding up the effective arms. Next, we can also consider a case where Alice replaces BS 1 and BS 2 to the reflecting mirrors (or equivalently, r = 1). In this case, Alice cannot encode her bit-message on the photon with P message = 0. Bob then does not need to use the deterministic paths, and the photon is not wasted with P Eve-check = 1. Such a setting can be used just to check the security before the full-scale message communication.
E. Impracticality of eavesdropping.
For the analysis of security, we assume here that there exists a malicious Eve who attempts to eavesdrop on the secret message. We discuss that an attempt by Eve will be unsuccessful due to Based on the above-described complications (C.1)-(C.3), it is believed that Eve's eavesdropping is probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical.
Nevertheless, we should always consider the existence of a potential Eve who has a reasonable (powerful) strategy to carry out the eavesdropping within the rules of quantum theory. Thus, we now perform a 'naive' theoretical analysis just to provide a convincing proof of the validity and security of our QSDC protocol. For the purpose, our analysis is focused on the Eve's eavesdropping probability that allows to estimate the amount of information Eve has gained. First, let us assume that Eve can adopt the primitive strategy of disturbing the moving photon (e.g., an interceptingand-resending attack) on the way of 'Bob → Alice' and 'Alice → Bob.' In such a strategy, Eve needs to see the polarization of the photon moving both forward (i.e., 'Bob → Alice') and backward Then, by considering all possible events described in Fig. 2 , we can evaluate the probability that Eve successfully eavesdrops on one bit of the message with respect to the reflectivity r of the general beam-splitters BS 1 and BS 2 as below:
(1 − r) 2 40 − 23r + 7r 2 .
This probability P eavesdropping is to be 0.0019 when r = 0. P eavesdropping becomes 0 when r = 1, which intuitively makes sense as Alice cannot encode her message in this case. When r = 1 2 , the probability P eavesdropping is as small as 0.0006, which indicates the impracticality of the eavesdropping. Here, one can also consider a more favorable strategy for the eavesdropping, namely a strategy of disturbing only the deterministic paths since the photon traveling along the superposed paths does not carry any message information. Such a strategy is actually possible if Eve can see
Bob's initial ϕ-setting. Then, the eavesdropping probability P eavesdropping is
which is a bit higher than Eq. (7), however still vanishingly small; P eavesdropping 0.0094 when r = 0 and P eavesdropping 0.0023 when r = 1 2 . Note here that even in such cases, Eve cannot verify whether or not her eavesdropping was successful.
We then assume that Eve owns a strategy to estimate the polarizations of Bob's initial photon, partially relaxing the complication (C.1). Such a clever Eve may try to extract the information of the initial polarizations by looking at the classical parameters (the angles of the wave-plates) or softwares of Bob's devicesÛ B . In such a case, nearly all existing QSDC (or similar quantum cryptographic) protocols based on the single-photon carriers may become insecure. However, our scheme is not damaged due to the use of the superposition path. Actually, we calculate that even for a more powerful Eve who can completely see Bob's initial polarization, the probability of eavesdropping one valid message-bit is still small. More explicitly, the eavesdropping probability P eavesdropping is given by
which is higher than those in the above case in Eq. (7), but still quite small. In fact, the probability is as small as 0.0481 when r = 1 2 . The probability becomes 0.25 when r = 0, in which the situation is exactly the same as that of the BB84 protocol. When r = 1, the probability is equal to 0. Note that Eve also still cannot verify her success in this case. Therefore, it is impractical to eavesdrop on the full message even with the ability to peep at Bob's initial polarization. We note again that such an advantage cannot be found in a typical (classical) way of just adding the possible pathways (in our case, the arms) to confuse Eve.
For further analysis, we consider the case of a super-Eve who can attack Bob's whole preparation settings (both the initial polarization and ϕ-setting). In this case our protocol cannot be considered secure any more. Eve will measure the initial polarization of the photon traveling 'Bob → Alice' only for the deterministic path (i.e., when ϕ = 0 and ϕ = π), and will try to extract the bit- Alice to Bob
it is inferred that Bob and Alice can be aware of an eavesdropping attempt, because in this case
Eve's measurement (aligned with the original Bob's polarization axis) in the way of 'Alice → Bob'
[specifically, in the green arrows in Fig. 2(a) ] can alter the polarization and can generate the invalid outcomes of Bob's analyzer. Noting that it is possible for a super-Eve to discriminate the photon path of the message-encoding event, it is easily found that
where P message is the probability of the message-encoding events defined in the above modified protocol. Here, P message = 1 4 (1 − r) 2 [see Eq. (6)] and the factor 2 3 is introduced due to the modification of the rule, i.e., adding one more option ϑ = π 8 . However, if there is an extremely strong eavesdropper who can also attack the random analyzer, then the protocol becomes insecure.
F. A practical strategy of using our protocol.
We here indicate that the above-described type of super-Eve can verify whether one eavesdropped bit is a valid message-bit or not in each trial, and super-Eve can extract several bits of the secret message until she is detected. Thus, on the basis of the above naive analyses, we provide a practical way of using our QSDC protocol to maximize security advantages. Our basic idea is 
where 
DISCUSSION
We have presented a general idea for achieving preparation-attack immunity by designing and proposing a novel linear-optical QSDC scheme, called preparation-attack-immune QSDC. In this protocol, a single-photon generated from Bob's side is to move through one of the two pathways (R-arm and L-arm) deterministically, or to simultaneously travel along the superposition path.
This photon can be detected in Alice's side, or be reflected (without being assisted by quantum memory) to Bob after taking a bit of Alice's message. In the former case Alice and Bob would share the information of the detection to sense a possible external attack, and in the latter case Bob would decode the bit of Alice's message. We then argued that our protocol is secure in the sense that it would be probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical for any eavesdropper Eve to extract even a piece of message information due to the complications (C.1)-(C.3). According to our 'naive' analysis, the probability that Eve successfully eavesdrops on one bit of the message is less than 0.002. The remarkable feature was that Alice and Bob can detect the existence of even a more powerful Eve who can attack Bob's initial polarization. In this case where Eve can look at the initial polarization encoding, the eavesdropping probability is 0.048. Analyzing further, if there is a super-Eve who can attack the whole preparation apparatus (both initial polarization and ϕ-setting), it is possible to detect her eavesdropping via the subtly-modified rules. Such a new kind of advantage that is the preparation-attack immunity (as opposed to doubling the encoding capacity or patching-up the information leakage [28, 29] ) was enabled owing to the use of the two-fold photon degree of freedom which maximizes the single-photon quantum superposition nature. In fact, we argued that it is impossible to achieve the preparation-attack immunity just by adding up the effective arms. To our knowledge, this is the first study to the problem of achieving the immunity against the preparation-attack in the preparation-and-measure QSDC scenario. We believe that our scheme can be realized with the current linear-optical stuffs, and further provides a strong motivation to develop the relevant optical technique [30, 31] . Our original idea can be generalized and developed further to improve the security of other single-photon based QKD protocols.
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• When ϕ = By observing the events and the occurring probabilities described above, we can calculate the event probabilities as
in which we assumed that the probabilities of choosing ϕ ∈ {0, . Note that these event probabilities can be determined by dialing the reflectivity r (or equivalently, the transmittance 1−r) of Alice's beam splitters BS 1 and BS 2 . This means that the overall time for the completion of the task and the security level can simultaneously be controlled by Alice (see the main manuscript).
In Fig. 4 , we present the event probabilities with respect to r. the following three cases. Eve can be discovered her eavesdropping in the ways of (i) Bob → Alice for superposed path, (ii) Bob → Alice for deterministic path, and (iii) Alice → Bob for deterministic path (we do not need to consider "Alice → Bob for superposed path, because the photon of this path does not carry the message-bit). 
where all possible events are considered (refer to Fig. 2 in the main manuscript) . Thus, the overall probability that Eve is not detected is given, such that (i) + (ii) + (iii) = 1 192 (40 − 23r + 7r 2 ). However, noting that Eve's successful eavesdropping is valid only for the message-encoding events, we can find the eavesdropping probability P eavesdropping as P eavesdropping = 1 16 × P message × 1 192 (40 − 23r + 7r 2 ) = 1 12288
(1 − r) 2 (40 − 23r + 7r 2 ),
where the factor 1 16 is introduced because Eve cannot verify both the initial polarization and ϕ-setting. 
and we can evaluate P eavesdropping = 1 16 × P message × (i) + (ii) + (iii) = 1 8192
(1 − r) 2 (77 − 6r + r 2 ).
Here we note that P eavesdropping is larger than Eq. (B2), but still vanishingly small. 
and P eavesdropping = P message × (i) + (ii) + (iii) = 1 48 (1 − r) 2 (12 − 7r + 3r 2 ),
which is much larger than Eq. (B2) and Eq. (B4). Here we indicate that when r = 0, Eve has P eavesdropping = 0.25. This intuitively makes sense, as in this case the situation is exactly equal to that of BB84 for Eve. Note further that P eavesdropping becomes small when r → 1. Of course, in this case, the overall time to complete the task will increase (see the main manuscript). In Fig. 5 , we depict the above described probabilities with respect to r.
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